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THE ORIGINS OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND
CONSERVATIVES
Colin Coulter
National University of Ireland, Maynooth
Abstract: This article sets out to tell the story of the Conservative associations that
appeared in parts of Northern Ireland in the late nineteen eighties. Ironically, the
emergence of the Ulster Tories may be attributed largely to the activities of a small
leftist sect. Throughout the seventies and eighties the British & Irish Communist
Organisation (B&ICO) developed and advanced an ideological programme of 'electoral
integrationism'. While the case for electoral integration attracted little attention initially,
the advent of the Anglo-Irish Agreement enabled it to reach a wider and more receptive
audience. The principal achievement of the electoral integrationist movement was perhaps
to persuade the British Conservative Party to establish constituency organisations in
Northern Ireland. Although opinion polls often suggested a bright future for Conservative
politics in the region, the early nineties saw the Ulster Tories suffer humiliation in
a sequence of elections. The swift and ignominious decline of the Northern Ireland
Conservatives is instructive not least because it casts light upon the troubled relationship
between Ulster unionists and the British state.
In the late nineteen eighties a series of Conservative associations were established
unexpectedly in the eastern reaches of Northern Ireland. Those who joined the ranks
of the Ulster Tories often claimed to be on the verge of breaking the mould of political
life in the six counties. In practice this confidence proved to be without foundation.
This flirtation between the unionist middle classes and British Conservatism would
ultimately last no more than five years. Although short-lived these efforts to promote
Conservative politics in the six counties retain considerable significance. The story
of the Northern Ireland Conservatives sheds important light upon crucial cultural
and political trends that define the nature of contemporary Northern Irish society. It,
therefore, deserves to be examined in some detail.
STALINISM AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONSERVATIVES
One of the more intriguing ironies of recent political life in Northern Ireland is that
the emergence of the local Conservatives may be attributed largely to the activities of
individuals situated on the far left. Although a small Stalinist splinter, the British and
Irish Communist Organisation (B&ICO) has exercised an important influence over the
political and intellectual life of the province (Jackson 1990). In the early seventies the
B&ICO broke with the prevailing republican socialist orthodoxy and began to construct
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a distinctive interpretation of the 'Northern Ireland problem' (B&ICO 1971, 1972,
1974, 1977; Workers'Association 1972, 1973, 1974). The zealots within the B&ICO
contended that the resurgence of communal unrest that heralded the modern troubles
was the inevitable outcome of the exceptional and subaltern status within the United
Kingdom that Northern Ireland has been forced to endure since its inception.
One of the abiding concerns of the British political establishment over the past
century has been to maintain a discreet distance from the troublesome territory formed
by the north eastern counties of Ireland (Cunningham 1991, 105-20; O'Leary &
McGarry 1993, 117-19; Ryan 1994, 157; Wright 1987, 185-6). The ambition of the
metropolis to insulate itself from the sectarian tensions of the region was inscribed in
the political arrangements that occasioned the creation of Northern Ireland (O'Dowd
1994; Ruane & Todd 1996,116). The actual terms of the partition settlement entitled the
residents of the six counties to exist merely on the margins of the United Kingdom. The
mode of government that obtained within the fledgling constitutional entity of Northern
Ireland differed enormously from that which operated throughout the other regions
of the state. The institutions of a legislative assembly were established in Belfast in
spite of the pronounced absence of local enthusiasm for the devolution of authority
from Westminster. The creation of a devolved parliament to oversee the affairs of the
province ensured that for half a century the people of Northern Ireland were compelled
to exist in a state of political quarantine.
In the late nineteen sixties, the resurgence of political unrest in Northern Ireland
signalled that the partition settlement had begun to unravel. As intercommunal relations
within the six counties deteriorated apace, a reluctant metropolis was forced to intervene
in the affairs of the province. In the spring of 1972 Westminster chose to exercise its
constitutional prerogative to prorogue the devolved parliament at Stormont and assume
direct responsibility for the governance of Northern Ireland. The dissolution of the
Stormont legislature could have marked a radical departure in the manner in which the
sovereign parliament chose to deal with the province. In principle, the advent of 'direct
rule' offered Westminster the opportunity to embrace Northern Ireland as an equal and
integral region of the state. In practice, however, the metropolis preferred to cling to
the traditional conception that the six counties are irretrievably 'different' (Rose 1982,
125; Ruane & Todd 1996,224-6; Wright 1987,198-99). The structures and mechanisms
through which direct rule operated fell considerably short of the standards of democratic
practice that obtained throughout the rest of the United Kingdom (Livingstone &
Morrison 1995; O'Leary & Arthur 1990,41). The distinctly autocratic fashion in which
Northern Ireland was governed after the abolition of Stormont ensured that the residents
of the six counties continued to endure rights of citizenship inferior to those enjoyed by
the inhabitants of the other regions of the state (Clayton 1996, 167-8).
The ambition of the metropolis to keep Northern Ireland 'at arm's length' found
further expression in the conduct of the British political parties. Those parties that
aspire to govern the United Kingdom have traditionally refused to admit as members
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individuals living in Northern Ireland. In their myriad publications the B&ICO
asserted that the aloofness of the parties of state towards the province had inevitably
proved thoroughly calamitous. The inclusion of Northern Ireland within the broader
party political life of the United Kingdom, the Stalinists insisted, would in time
have eroded the sectarian enmities that fester within the six counties. The parties
of state would have provided that secular environment in which the people of
the province could gradually exchange ethnoreligious affiliation for rather more
temporal forms of political identity. The unwillingness of the British political
parties to contest elections in Northern Ireland had, therefore, acted to confirm
the sectarian poverty of the public life of the region. Excluded from the secular
environs of the Labour and Conservative parties, the people of Northern Ireland had
been compelled to inhabit the narrow ground of a provincial political culture mired
in ethnoreligious feeling and division.
The distinctive reading of the Northern Irish conflict tendered by the B&ICO
drew the faction towards a radical prescription for the ills of the province. The
activists within the B&ICO insisted that the origins of the modern troubles are to
be found in the anomalous and unequal status afforded to Northern Ireland from
the moment of its creation. The resolution of the conflict requires, therefore, that
the metropolis acknowledge Northern Ireland as an equal and integral region of
the state. The six counties should be governed through structures and according to
principles deemed appropriate for the administration of the United Kingdom as a
whole. Executive authority over the province should be exercised by the sovereign
parliament at Westminster rather than a devolved assembly in Belfast. Moreover,
the six counties should be assimilated into the mainstream civic life of the United
Kingdom. In particular, the residents of the province should be entitled to join
and pass electoral judgement on those parties that aspire to form a government at
Westminster. Admission to the party political life of the state would - the B&ICO
asserted - elevate the people of Northern Ireland to the status of 'equal citizens'
(Workers'Weekly 14/5/77).
The leftist credentials of the B&ICO ensured that the principal concern of the
sect was to ensure the organisation throughout Northern Ireland of that particular
party considered to hold greatest promise of advancing the interests of the province's
working classes. By the mid seventies the foremost intellectuals within the B&ICO
had arrived at the opinion that the prospects of political progress hinged upon the
British Labour Party establishing constituency associations within the six counties.
Drawn fully into the wider environment of a labour movement that encompasses
the entire state, Northern Irish workers would be offered the opportunity to eschew
the distractions of ethnoreligious affiliation in order to pursue the imperative of
class interest (Workers' Weekly 22/10/77). The decision of the British Labour Party
to extend membership to Northern Ireland would, therefore, herald the advance of
working class consciousness within the six counties.
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The conviction that the British labour movement held the key to political
progress in Northern Ireland prompted the B&ICO into action. In the summer
of 1977 its members began to devote their considerable energies to the cause of
persuading the British Labour Party to organise throughout Northern Ireland. The
demand that Labour extend membership to people living in the six counties was
articulated through various cover organisations. Perhaps the most significant of
these was the Campaign for Labour Representation (CLR) which was established
during 1978. Through the agency of the CLR the B&ICO sought to court opinion
among the various elements of the British labour movement (B&ICO 1979a,b).
While the lucid polemic of the pressure group often attracted admiration, the
characteristically combative style of its members frequently alienated potential
sympathisers.
During the late seventies and early eighties the overriding concern of the
B&ICO was to ensure that Northern Irish workers secure the right to join the British
Labour Party. The interpretative stance adopted by the faction insisted, however,
that the people of the province should be assimilated more fully into not merely the
labour movement but also the wider public life of the state. The political enterprise
endorsed by the B&ICO required not only that the Labour Party should organise
throughout the six counties but that those other parties that aspire to govern the
United Kingdom should follow suit. Over time the demand that all of the parties
of state should stand for election in the province became more explicit. In 1984
the B&ICO published a pamphlet under the guise of The Integration Group - yet
another in the seemingly endless sequence of cover names adopted by the sect.
While the document offered a fairly standard exposition of the case for Northern
Ireland being governed in the same manner as the other regions of the United
Kingdom, it did contain one genuine innovation. The Integration Group suggested
that the decision of the Conservative Party to accept members from Northern
Ireland would constitute an enormous stride 'towards equal citizenship'
By the mid eighties the B&ICO had constructed an arguably cogent political
programme. The activities of the CLR had brought the counsel of the Stalinist sect
to a wider audience than hitherto. Indeed, the pressure group managed to garner
sufficient sympathy within the Labour Party for the issue of establishing branches
throughout Northern Ireland to appear on the agenda of the 1983 annual conference
(Workers' Weekly 11/10/86). While the B&ICO had made some ground in the early
eighties, the organisation remained nonetheless a small voice on the exotic fringes
of Northern Irish political life. The incessant demand for 'equal citizenship' was
typically voiced through the columns of invariably obscure and often impenetrable
journals. The seismic constitutional developments of the mid eighties, however,
would transform the political fortunes of the B&ICO. The advent of the Anglo-Irish
Agreement would ensure that the views articulated by the Stalinists of the B&ICO
began to reach a larger and rather more receptive audience.
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THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR EQUAL CITIZENSHIP
On the afternoon of Friday 15 November 1985 representatives of the British and Irish
governments signed an international agreement at Hillsborough Castle. The appearance
of the Anglo-Irish Agreement transformed the parameters and contours of the political
life of Northern Ireland. The most significant aspect of the Hillsborough Accord was
that it appeared to occasion a dilution of the sovereignty that Westminster exercises
over Northern Ireland. Under the provisions of the accord, the government of the Irish
Republic became entitled for the first time to a consultative role in the administration
of the six counties (Hadden & Boyle 1989, 22). The Anglo-Irish Agreement further
featured the assertion that should a majority of the people of Northern Ireland wish
to leave the United Kingdom, Westminster would facilitate that ambition (Aughey
1989,55). In signing the agreement, therefore, the British government appeared to have
declared formal indifference concerning the constitutional status of Northern Ireland.
The appearance of the Anglo-Irish Agreement inevitably and immediately drew the
wrath of the entire unionist community. Unionists were especially enraged by the role
that the agreement had afforded to the southern Irish state. Representatives of unionist
opinion denounced the Hillsborough Accord as an insufferable violation of national
sovereignty. In endorsing the accord, London had chosen to cede authority to a state
held to be foreign and hostile. The Anglo-Irish Agreement alarmed unionists further
on the grounds that the document appeared to confirm the alleged insouciance of the
British political establishment towards the people of Northern Ireland. The impact of
the events of 15 November 1985 upon unionists was evidently traumatic (Loughlin
1995,212; Ruane&Todd 1996,113-5). The introduction of the Anglo-Irish Agreement
heralded a crisis for Ulster Unionism that was both political and intellectual (Cochrane
1997). In the emotional aftermath of the Hillsborough Accord, elements within the
unionist fold came to the realisation that the imminent battle for the Union would occur
largely upon the terrain of the ideal. If the constitutional status of Northern Ireland
were to be guaranteed, unionists would have to reflect more fully upon the nature of
their political identities and ambitions. Moreover, those who sought to defend the Union
would have to disseminate their beliefs and aspirations to a wider audience than had
been the case hitherto.
The occupants of the mainstream of Unionist politics were clearly, however, less
than able for this urgent task of ideological and ontological renewal. Faced with
the biggest crisis since the dissolution of Stormont more than a decade earlier,
the key players within the principal Unionist parties responded with characteristic
conservatism. Rather than seek to forge radical political strategies, the leaders of Ulster
Unionism chose to cling wearily to antiquated forms of thought and practice (Aughey
1989, 138-46; O'Malley 1990, 37). The political crisis occasioned by the Anglo-Irish
Agreement merely served, therefore, to cast the philosophical dereliction of the Unionist
mainstream into yet bolder relief (Cochrane 1997; Porter 1996, 6-11). The intellectual
crisis of Ulster Unionism would, however, prove to be the political opportunity of
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the B&ICO. The traumas visited by the Anglo-Irish Agreement had rendered many
unionists more open to new political ideas and direction. In the climate of ideological
flux that followed the Hillsborough Accord, the Stalinists of the B&ICO sought to bring
their views to a wider political audience. In the months that followed the Anglo-Irish
Agreement, the pivotal B&ICO intellectual Brendan Clifford (1985,1986a,b; Davidson
1986a,b) produced a series of lucid pamphlets which set out to explain the origins of
the political storm that had recently engulfed the six counties. According to Clifford,
the Anglo-Irish Agreement should be viewed as merely a symptom of a deeper malaise.
The manifold ills that have afflicted Northern Irish society derive principally from the
profoundly 'unrepresentative' manner in which the province has been administered.
Since the dissolution of the Stormont legislature the sovereign parliament has chosen
to govem the six counties in a distinctly unaccountable fashion. The colonial status that
has been conferred upon the province by the metropolis cannot, however, be attributed
primarily to the peculiarly autocratic form that direct rule has assumed. The people
of Northern Ireland have been subjected to a reign of 'parliamentary despotism' not
because they have been governed directly by Westminster but rather because they have
been excluded from that process of party political competition that determines the
balance of power within the sovereign parliament.
The interpretation offered by Brendan Clifford and others within the B&ICO camp
was that genuinely democratic practice depends upon the operation of political parties.
The conduct of political parties is prompted, Clifford (1986a) argued, not by grand
social philosophies but rather by the proclivities of the electorate. An effective system
of party political competition operates, in other words, 'by means of reflexes rather than
theories' (Roberts 1990,131). A political party that seeks to secure public office through
the democratic process cannot afford to behave in a consistently autocratic fashion.
Failure to accommodate the feelings and aspirations of citizens would inevitably ensure
a shift in electoral preference that would consign the government to the ineffectual
status of parliamentary opposition (Clifford 1986b). It is the effective competition
between political parties in common pursuit of executive authority, therefore, that
constitutes the ultimate guarantor of genuinely accountable government. The people
of Northern Ireland, however, are excluded from that process of party political rivalry
that produces the government of the state of which they happen to be citizens. Those
political parties that can reasonably aspire to form a majority in the sovereign parliament
choose not to stand for election in the six counties. The inhabitants of the province.
are denied, therefore, the opportunity to effect those swings of electoral preference
that can dislodge a government from office or sweep an opposition into power. As a
consequence, the principal parties of state have little incentive to accommodate the
interests and ambitions of the people of Northern Ireland (The Equal Citizen March/
April 1986). The ruling party of the day can choose to govern the province in a
thoroughly unaccountable manner safe in the knowledge that the residents of the six
counties will be unable to exact electoral retribution.
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In the emotional aftermath of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the activists within the
B&ICO strove with renewed vigour to advance a political programme designed to
herald an era of genuinely accountable government within Northern Ireland.. The prime
movers within the B&ICO demanded that the people of Northern Ireland should be
assimilated fully into the party political life of the state. Those parties that sought to
form a majority within the sovereign parliament should admit the residents of the six
counties as members and stand for election in the region. The advent of 'electoral
integration' would - its advocates insisted - sound the death knell of unaccountable
government in Northern Ireland (Davidson 1986b). Admission to the party political
culture of the state would enable the Northern Irish electorate to generate those
relatively small shifts in the balance of political power that can transform government
into opposition. The fear of electoral reproach would compel the parties at Westminster
to respond with greater sensitivity to the interests and ambitions of voters living in
Northern Ireland. The implementation of measures as offensive to the democratic will
as the Hillsborough Accord would become inconceivable. Assimilation into the party
politics of the United Kingdom would, therefore, enable the people of Northern Ireland
to hold Westminster to account. The realisation of electoral integration would, in other
words, transform the voters of the region from the status of British subjects to that of
British citizens.
Through the columns of their journals The Equal Citizen and Workers' Weekly the
B&ICO attempted to court the opinion of unionists disorientated by recent political
developments. The bold and imaginative ideological enterprise mapped out by the Athol
Street sect evidently exercised a resonance for many within the unionist community
(O'Dowd 1998a, 73). In the spring of 1986 those disparate individuals who had been
drawn to the case for 'equal citizenship' or 'electoral integration' joined forces. Over
the next couple of years the Campaign for Equal Citizenship (CEC) came to play a
significant role in the public life of Northern Ireland (O'Dowd 1998b, 117). The initial
strategy that the CEC adopted predictably entailed an attempt to convert the Ulster
Unionist Party to the cause of'equal citizenship'. Throughout the summer and autumn
of 1986 the President of the pressure group - the influential but volatile barrister Robert
McCartney (1986a,b) - canvassed opinion within the party. The struggle for the hearts
and minds of Ulster Unionists reached a climax at the annual conference held on 6
November. In a move widely interpreted as a leadership bid, McCartney tabled a motion
demanding that the UUP commit itself to the strategy of electoral integration. Anxious
to resist the ambitions of the CEC President, the Ulster Unionist leadership countered
with an amendment stating that, in the interests of Unionist unity, any change in the
direction of the party would have to await the demise of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The
amendment was duly carried by 199 votes to 143.
The developments at the 1986 UUP annual conference indicated that while the case
for 'equal citizenship' had gained considerable ground the principal voice of Ulster
Unionism remained unwilling to embrace a new political direction. The defeat of
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the motion proposed by Robert McCartney nurtured the growing belief among CEC
members that electoral integrationism could only be advanced outside the realm of
established Unionist politics. The events of the following summer would merely
serve to confirm that particular conviction. During the 1987 Westminster elections the
mainstream Unionist parties persisted with the electoral pact devised in the immediate
wake of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Unionist candidates would not stand against one
another, even in safe Unionist seats. The North Down Ulster Unionist Association
decided, however, to break the electoral cartel and put forward Robert McCartney as
competition for the sitting Independent Unionist MP Jim Kilfedder. The leadership
of the party promptly responded by expelling the North Down association en masse.
Undeterred, McCartney decided to run as an independent 'Real Unionist' on an electoral
integrationist ticket. The campaign that unfolded in North Down was to prove one of
the most compelling and acrimonious contests of the 1987 General Election (Cochrane
1997, 176). Aided by the support of others within the 'Unionist Family', Kilfedder
managed to retain his seat albeit with a greatly reduced majority. While McCartney
may have failed in his bid to seize North Down, there was nonetheless much from
which the CEC could draw comfort. In particular, the run up to the election had marked
the publication of the first of a series of opinion polls suggesting a level of support
for the principles of 'equal citizenship' which even seasoned political commentators
considered to be 'remarkable' (Bew & Patterson 1990, 209). Hence, even in the wake
of defeat, many members of the CEC believed the election to have heralded a bright
political future for the pressure group. In reality, however, the North Down campaign
was to prove the beginning of the end of the CEC as a mass organisation.
One of the essential attributes of those who joined the CEC was their remarkable
political diversity. For a time the pressure group proved able to accommodate a body
of individuals who shared little in common save for the conviction that the strictures of
democratic practice demanded that the British political parties should run for election
in the province. Stalinists found common cause with Thatcherites. Gay rights activists
rubbed shoulders with the more genteel elements of the Northern Irish middle classes.
The quintessential diversity of the CEC would ultimately prove, however, to be its
Achilles heel. The ideological differences among those drawn to the ideal of electoral
integration gradually and inevitably nurtured division. In the year that followed the
'Real Unionist' campaign in North Down clear fissures opened up within the CEC
(Wilson 1988). The disputes that embroiled the pressure group centred frequently upon
the style and direction of leadership provided by its President. The most vehement
criticism directed towards McCartney came inevitably from those associated with
the B&ICO (Workers' Weekly 12/3/88, 19/3/88, 26/3/88). Dissidents within the CEC
alleged that under the autocratic leadership of McCartney the organisation had taken
a political course that infringed those principles upon which it was founded. In the
minds of those within the orbit of the B&ICO, the essential promise of the CEC was
that of a broadly based civil rights organisation that would appeal to people from all
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ethnoreligious backgrounds and none. The political direction that the pressure group
had taken had, however, betrayed that noble ideal. Under the leadership of Robert
McCartney, the CEC had been reduced to little more than yet another intemperate voice
in the quarrels of the 'Unionist family'
The tensions simmering within the ranks of the CEC finally came to a head at a
fractious special general meeting held on June 18 1988. As the meeting progressed it
became clear that the dissidents within the pressure group were in a minority. Realising
that they had lost control of the organisation they had created, the supporters of the
B&ICO withdrew from the CEC and poured vitriol upon those who remained. Although
damaging, the withdrawal of support from the B&ICO scarcely dealt a fatal blow to
the CEC. The B&ICO provided the initial ideological impetus that brought the CEC
into existence. Nonetheless, those associated with the Stalinist splinter provided only
a small proportion of the entire membership of the pressure group. It was conceivable,
therefore, that the CEC could have survived the bloodletting of the spring and summer
of 1988. In reality, however, the days of the CEC as a mass organisation were about
to come to an end. Ironically, the pressure group would be fatally undermined not by
the machinations of the Stalinists of the B&ICO but by the activities of the rather more
'respectable' elements within the electoral integrationist fold.
THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONSERVATIVES
The political programme advanced by the CEC attracted the support of individuals
drawn from a variety of social and ideological backgrounds. The ideal of electoral
integration clearly proved particularly attractive, however, to the more affluent sections
of the unionist community (Coulter 1996, 1997; McKay 2000, 37). While concerned
that all of the British parties should extend organisation to Northern Ireland, the social
location and interests of middle class unionists ensured that they were particularly
concerned to secure the opportunity to join and vote for the Conservative Party (Duffy
and Evans 1996, 132-6). Over time the Conservatives within the electoral integrationist
fold became convinced of the need for a discrete organisation that would operate under
the umbrella of the CEC but would work specifically to ensure that the Conservative
Party accept members from the province. In March 1988 the Campaign for Conservative
Representation (CCR) was established to serve that purpose. The following month
witnessed a further significant development with the formation in the constituency of
North Down of a Model Conservative Association (NDMCA). The rationale behind
the NDMCA was to illustrate that there existed within Northern Ireland support for
the Conservative Party and thereby exert pressure upon Smith Square to establish
constituency associations throughout the province. The strategy adopted by the North
Down Tories soon appeared to have borne fruit. During the local government elections
of May 1989 a slate of Conservative candidates ran for office in North Down. The
Conservatives polled strongly, securing six seats to become the single largest party
represented on North Down district council.
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Encouraged by the success of the local government elections, the Ulster Tories
forged ahead with the campaign to persuade the Conservative Party to open its ranks
to people living in Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Conservatives adopted a
skilful and imaginative strategy that drew admiration even from an otherwise hostile
party hierarchy. Among the principal concerns of the Ulster Tories was to engage the
sympathy of the grassroots of the Conservative Party (Aughey 1994, 144-6). In their
promotional material the Northern Ireland Conservatives were keen to offer
themselves as people who were essentially the same as Conservatives who happened to
live in other regions of the United Kingdom. The solid bourgeois credentials of the
Ulster Tories were frequently underlined. Events at the next annual conference of the
Conservative Party testified to the Ulster Tories' powers of persuasion. On 10 October
1989 Conservative delegates gathered at Blackpool voted overwhelmingly to endorse
a motion encouraging the party to organise in Northern Ireland (Cunningham 1995,
35). The grave expressions on the faces of the dignitaries gathered on the platform
suggested that the hierarchy did not share the enthusiasm for electoral integration being
expressed by the grassroots (Pearce 1989). Bowing to pressure from the rank and file
of the party, the Executive Committee of the National Union agreed reluctantly at a
meeting convened on 6 November to accept the applications for affiliation from four
Conservative associations established in Northern Ireland - North Down, South Belfast,
East Antrim and Strangford. After a campaign that had lasted barely eighteen months,
the Northern Ireland Conservatives had secured their principal objective of admission
to the party of government.
The decision of the Conservative Party to accept members from Northern Ireland
was greeted within the CEC as a major victory. The affiliation of the Ulster Tories
would, however, inevitably precipitate the decline of the pressure group. The arduous
task of advancing further the case for electoral integration in the face of stern opposition
from many quarters - not least within the British Labour Party (Bew & Dixon 1994,
162-3) - proved of course rather less attractive than the apparent prospect of exercising
real political influence within the party of government. In the months that followed the
historic Blackpool conference, many middle class unionists who had joined the CEC
allowed their membership to lapse and opted instead for one of the various Conservative
associations springing up in many parts of Northern Ireland. As its support evaporated
the leaders of the CEC quickly realised that the body could no longer function as a mass
campaigning pressure group. In the winter of 1990 the organisation decided to reinvent
itself as a political 'think tank'. The new streamlined CEC, however, would never
manage to exercise influence on the scale that it had in the heady days that followed
the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Finally in 1993 the few remaining stalwarts bowed to the
seemingly inevitable and formally wound up the pressure group.
The dramatic events at the 1989 Conservative Party conference understandably
offered enormous encouragement to the Ulster Tories. The ease with which admission
to the party had been secured also, however, inflated the expectations of the Northern
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Ireland Conservatives. In the afterglow of affiliation, many Ulster Tories were convinced
that they stood on the threshold of an historic political breakthrough. Complacency
would shortly prompt the Conservatives to commit the first of many errors of political
judgement. The death of the Ulster Unionist MP Harold McCusker in the spring of
1990 offered the Ulster Tories the first opportunity since affiliation to gauge support
in a parliamentary election. There was little evidence of support for the Conservatives
in Upper Bann and many party activists were resolutely opposed to running in the
constituency. The Upper Bann Conservative Association - which had been affiliated
only three weeks in advance of the poll - nonetheless decided to field a candidate. The
result of the election entirely vindicated the misgivings of those who had counselled
against standing. The Conservative candidate Collette Jones limped in sixth and failed
to retain her deposit.
In the aftermath of the calamitous Upper Bann by-election the Northern Ireland
Conservatives set about building constituency organisations beyond their heartland of
North Down in preparation for the forthcoming Westminster elections. When a General
Election was called for 9 April 1992 the Conservatives nominated eleven candidates.
The Ulster Tories performed moderately well. Conservative candidates received 45,000
votes - six per cent of the electorate overall and ten per cent in those constituencies
where they had actually run. The respectable performance of the Ulster Tories was
tarnished, however, by the failure of Dr. Laurence Kennedy to secure North Down.
The constituency was the only one in which the Northern Ireland Conservatives had
a realistic chance of victory. Success in North Down was essential if the Ulster
Tories were to establish themselves as a credible electoral force. The failure to prise
the constituency from the sitting Independent Unionist MP Jim Kilfedder, therefore,
represented an enormous setback for the fledgling Conservative associations in Northern
Ireland.
The electoral prospects of the Ulster Tories were undermined by a number of
considerations. Not the least of these was the transparent indifference with which
Conservative Central Office viewed members living in Northern Ireland. The affiliation
of associations established in the six counties appeared to mark an important shift in the
disposition of the hierarchy of the Conservative Party. In practice, however, the formal
endorsement of the principle of electoral integration made little discernible impact upon
the outlook and conduct of more senior Conservatives (O'Dowd 1998a, 116; McGarry
and O'Leary 1995, 312). Influential figures within the Conservative Party continued
in the main to be guided by the perennial concern of keeping the affairs of Northern
Ireland at a discreet distance. The Tories frequently appeared entirely indifferent as to
the welfare of their associations located in the province. The recurrent reluctance of
senior Conservatives to endorse fellow Tories running for election in the six counties
clearly signalled that the party had little genuine ambition to become an influential force
in the political affairs of the province. Those Conservatives who stood for office in
the six counties in effect provided the people of Northern Ireland with the unusual and
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possibly unique opportunity of voting for a political party that actually would rather not
have had their support. It is scarcely surprising that all but a few of the Northern Irish
electorate should have declined.
The evident disregard of Conservative Central Office for their interests quickly
became a major source of grievance among the Ulster Tories. In advance of the
Westminster elections, the Northern Ireland Conservatives considered it prudent to
conceal their growing disenchantment with the party hierarchy. Once the polls had
closed, however, the Ulster Tories promptly broke their silence. The disappointment of
coming second in North Down immediately moved the most prominent Conservative
in Northern Ireland to give vent to the disillusionment increasingly common among
the Ulster Tories. Once the result had been declared, Dr. Laurence Kennedy launched
a blistering attack upon the hierarchy of the Conservative Party for having offered
insufficient support to his campaign. The strident public admonition issued by
Dr. Kennedy soured yet further the already frosty relations that existed between
Conservative Central Office and the Ulster Tories. The deterioration of relations with
Smith Square was to prove merely symptomatic, however, of the wider difficulties that
the Northern Ireland Conservatives had begun to encounter. In the year that followed
the Westminster elections the fortunes of the Ulster Tories nose-dived. The ignominious
decline of the Northern Ireland Conservatives was mercilessly confirmed by the local
government elections held in May 1993. Conservative candidates seeking election to
district council chambers were routed. The Ulster Tories captured only six seats and
secured less than one per cent of the vote.
Already weakened by their disastrous performance in the local government elections,
the Northern Ireland Conservatives were undermined further by the clandestine
negotiations that attended the passage of the Masstricht Bill through the House of
Commons (Cochrane 1997, 304). Faced with the prospect of a humiliating defeat in
parliament, the Conservative Prime Minister entered into a pact in order to secure the
support of the nine Ulster Unionist MPs (Dixon 1994; McCann 1993, 56-7). One of the
understandings at which John Major and the Ulster Unionists had apparently arrived
was that the Conservatives would allow their associations situated in Northern Ireland
to 'wither on the vine' (Bevins 1993). The creation of the parliamentary pact between
the Conservative and Ulster Unionist parties inevitably infuriated the Ulster Tories.
Already disillusioned with the inability of the Northern Ireland Conservatives to make
a meaningful impression upon the political culture of the six counties, Dr. Laurence
Kennedy announced that he would resign his seat on North Down borough council
and bow out of public life (Duffy and Evans 1996, 126). The events of the summer
of 1993 indicated that the Northern Ireland Conservatives had been swiftly consigned
to the very margins of political life in the six counties. Some of the Conservative
associations established in the province have obstinately continued to field candidates
for election. The Ulster Tories have, however, been routinely humiliated at the polls.
Recent elections have seen the Conservatives fail to perform respectably even in their
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former stronghold of North Down (McKay 2000, 37). In the Westminster election of
1992 the Tories drew support from one third of voters in the constituency. The three
Conservatives who have stood in subsequent parliamentary elections in North Down,
however, have been unable to retain their deposits.
.THE 'MEANING' OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONSERVATIVES
The emergence of the Northern Ireland Conservatives in the late nineteen eighties
represented a genuinely unanticipated turn of events. The view common among many
commentators at the time suggested that the advent of the Ulster Tories should be
considered as merely an aberration in the political life of the six counties. The
spectacular and swift demise of the Northern Ireland Conservatives in the early nineteen
nineties seemed of course to bear out this interpretation. It would nonetheless be a
mistake simply to dismiss the emergence of the Ulster Tories as an aberrant political
development. In certain respects, the establishment of Conservative associations within
the province more than a decade ago marked an entirely rational development.
After the dissolution of the Stormont legislature the sovereign parliament at
Westminster proceeded to govern Northern Ireland in a manner reminiscent of a distant
colonial possession. The institutions and procedures that were installed under direct
rule infringed - as we noted earlier- even the most rudimentary standards of democratic
practice. None of the individuals who exercised political authority in relation to
Northern Ireland were actually elected by the people of the region. The considerable
powers at the disposal of the executive, moreover, were subject to few of the checks
and balances that are conventionally assumed to be the hallmark of a liberal democracy.
The distinctly autocratic nature of direct rule offered as grave offence to the political
sensibilities of middle class unionists as to those of their less prosperous ethnopolitical
kin. While the professionals and business people among the unionist community may
well have resented and distrusted the substantial powers in the hands of Westminster,
the specific policies that the direct rulers of the province employed their authority to
implement often in fact proved very much to their liking.
Among the preoccupations of the metropolis after the fall of Stormont was a concern
to nurture within Northern Ireland those social and economic conditions deemed
appropriate to a genuine resolution of the conflict. As a consequence the era of direct
rule witnessed a substantial and sustained increase in public expenditure in the six
counties (McKay 2000, 36). The fiscal benevolence of the British state served to
enhance the general standard of living in Northern Ireland. The material gains secured
under direct rule were, however, neither universal nor evenly distributed. The relative
generosity of the British exchequer conferred especial benefit upon the professional
and business classes in the region. The expansion of the public sector in the period of
direct rule ensured the creation of a considerable number of secure and comparatively
lucrative positions that were swiftly filled by the province's burgeoning middle classes
(McGovern and Shirlow 1997, 188-9). Those who became state employees in the
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seventies and eighties received salaries on a par with their counterparts in other parts of
the United Kingdom but, crucially, faced house prices much lower than most British
regions. The superior purchasing power of the Northern Irish middle classes would
in time come to find expression in ever more conspicuous forms of consumption
(Breen 1994). For many people living in the six counties - unionists and others - the
era of direct rule soon came to assume the status of a golden age.
The decision to prorogue the Stormont parliament had been greeted with almost
unanimous disapproval within the unionist community. As the material advantages
flowing from direct rule became increasingly apparent, however, a great deal of
the initial hostility that unionists had articulated began to dissipate. The more
affluent elements within the unionist fold in particular abandoned their erstwhile
commitment to the restoration of devolution with almost indecent haste. The rapid
shifts in the outlook and allegiance of the unionist middle classes that occurred in
the nineteen seventies were soon offered ideological expression with the emergence
of a political disposition that has been conventionally denoted as 'integrationist'
but which Bew and Patterson (1987a) have persuasively designated 'minimalist'.
Minimalist integrationists - prominent among them former Ulster Unionist Party
leader James Molyneaux - argued that Northern Ireland would be best governed
permanently from Westminster not least because the terms of a future devolved
settlement would in all likelihood be unfavourable to unionists. The pragmatic
endorsement of direct rule encoded within the minimalist position evidently chimed
with the particular material interests of the unionist middle classes.
The enterprise of minimalist integrationism, moreover, bore the indelible
impression of the conservatism that defines the political disposition of middle class
unionists. Minimalist integrationists consistently eschewed those radical political
strategies that might threaten to alienate metropolitan opinion. Conscious that the
constitutional fate of Northern Ireland lies ultimately in the hands of the sovereign
parliament, figures such as Molyneaux adopted a decidedly conciliatory approach
towards the British political establishment. The health of the Union would be best
served - it was insisted - not by radical words and deeds on the streets of Ulster
but rather by the careful courting of opinion within the corridors of power in
Westminster and Whitehall. The essential promise of minimalist integrationism was
that it would enable unionists to quietly exercise meaningful influence within the
centres of metropolitan authority. Throughout the early nineteen eighties senior
figures within the Ulster Unionist Party were wont to suggest that they 'had the
ear' of important players within the British political establishment. The signing of
the Anglo-Irish Agreement, however, would mercilessly expose these suggestions
as being without foundation. The distinct ease with which the Hillsborough Accord
proceeded through the House of Commons offered the most telling illustration
imaginable that unionism has few friends and little influence within the sovereign
parliament.
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The impact of the Anglo-Irish Agreement upon professional and business people
was no less traumatic than upon the rest of the unionist community. In the decade
that preceded the Hillsborough Accord a debilitating political complacency had
descended upon the unionist middle classes. As the material advantages of direct
rule became increasingly apparent, middle class unionists more or less opted out of
politics altogether (McKay 2000, 37, 258). The signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement
would, however, jolt the more affluent sections of unionism from their ideological
reverie. The advent of the Hillsborough Accord forced many middle class unionists to
reflect critically for the first time upon the precarious nature of their political position.
The terms of the deal struck by the British and Irish governments in the winter
of 1985 brought home to the unionist middle classes that while the power of the
executive under direct rule had been used in the past to their considerable economic
advantage it could be employed with equal ease to their political disadvantage.
Suddenly conscious of the vulnerability of their position, many professional and
business people within the unionist community came to see the need to be more active
in the political affairs of the six counties. The enterprise of minimalist integrationism
to which the unionist middle classes had in the past offered at least their passive
support had of course been largely discredited. As a result, many middle class
unionists had become rather more receptive than hitherto to new political ideas and
directions. This opening up of ideological space on the 'respectable' margins of
unionism created the conditions that would for a time enable electoral integrationism
to move to the centre stage of Northern Irish political life.
The electoral integrationist project came to exercise considerable appeal among
the unionist middle classes in the late eighties precisely because it seemed able to
resolve those gnawing contradictions that had defined their particular experience of
direct rule. The various measures advocated by electoral integrationists dovetailed
neatly with the specific material interests of the more prosperous sections of
unionism. Had the ideal of electoral integration been fully realised direct rule from
Westminster would have become both stable and permanent. The intention of electoral
integrationism was, in other words, to secure that mode of government that had
bestowed enormous material advantage upon the more affluent fragments of the
unionist population. The electoral integrationist project promised to the unionist
middle classes not only that they could retain their comfortable lifestyles but also
that their continued prosperity would not have to come at the cost of political
subordination. The strategy of 'equal citizenship' exercised a great deal of resonance
among middle class unionists in part becau ;e it seemed to offer a way to transcend
that political dependence upon the British state that had defined the period of direct
rule. In the minds of its advocates, electoral integration would herald an era of genuine
democracy in Northern Ireland. Once the people of the province were admitted to the
parties of state, the autocratic mode of government that had blighted direct rule would
become untenable. Those parties that aspired to form the executive in Westminster
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would as a matter of course be compelled to tailor their policies to the interests of
voters living in the six counties. The people of Northern Ireland would become full
and equal citizens of the British state.
While many middle class unionists were clearly drawn to the principle of 'equal
citizenship' the relationship would, however, never be fully consummated. In order
to explain the ignominious demise of electoral integrationism we need to examine
the troubled relationship of unionists to the British state. The political disposition
of contemporary Ulster unionism exhibits a distinct and abiding ambivalence. While
unionists have deep feelings of affiliation to the British state they also distrust many
of the actors and agencies at its heart (Loughlin 1995). The minds of unionists are
perennially troubled by the nagging suspicion that their devotion to the Union may
well be unrequited. Many unionists share an anxiety that it is the ultimate ambition of
the British state to facilitate the circumstances under which the troublesome territory
of Northern Ireland would finally leave the United Kingdom. It is this concern that
reproduces many of the more unsavoury traits of the unionist mindset.
The pervasive distrust among unionists concerning the ambitions and actions of the
British state ultimately proved to be the undoing of the 'equal citizenship'project. Those
who sought to advance the electoral integrationist cause asserted that the indifference
or perhaps even hostility of Westminster to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland
should be seen as the inevitable outcome of the exclusion of the province from the
party political life of the state. The advent of electoral integration would - its proponents
insisted - enable the Union to be renewed. Access to the real centres of political
authority within the United Kingdom would allow the people of Northern Ireland to
prevent those course of action that threaten to injure their interests. Operating within
the grassroots of the parties of state would ensure that individuals from the province
would come to establish essential channels of communication with their fellow British
citizens. In time, Northern Ireland would come to assume the status of simply another
region of the United Kingdom.
The success of the electoral integrationist enterprise hinged crucially upon whether
a critical mass of unionists was willing or able to share this particular vision. It soon
transpired, of course, that this was not in fact the case. While many unionists longed for
a political settlement that would allow them to be full and equal citizens of the United
Kingdom, few seemed able to imagine such an eventuality. The 'equal citizenship'
project demanded of the unionist community a fundamental leap of political faith. If the
principles of electoral integration were to be realised, unionists would in future have to
place their faith in parties that had in the recent past spoken and acted in ways deemed
injurious to the unionist cause. While electoral integration held much that appealed to
unionists, few within the unionist fold were prepared to make this act of trust. Most
preferred instead to persevere with the traditional assumption that the cause of the
Union would be best served by political interests that are formally independent of
the parties of state. The recent troubled history of Northern Ireland throws up many
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illustrations of unionist distrust of the British state. Few are more dramatic, however,
than the sequence of humiliations that unionists visited upon Conservative candidates
standing for election in the early nineteen nineties.
CONCLUSION
At first glance the tale of the Northern Ireland Conservative might appear merely
an intriguing footnote to the rather more substantial narratives that form the recent
turbulent history of the six counties. The Ulster Tories failed, after all, to make a
meaningful impression upon the political culture of the province. The achievements
of the Northern Ireland Conservatives amounted to little more than a single term in
control of a single district council chamber. The story of the Ulster Tories possesses a
significance, however, rather greater than might be suggested by the trail of deposits lost
by Conservative candidates. Its real importance lies primarily in the light it casts upon
the vexed relationship between Ulster unionists and the British state.
The developments that took place at the 1989 Conservative Party conference offered
the British political establishment - in principle at least - the opportunity to adopt
a rather different disposition towards Northern Ireland. Had Smith Square genuinely
sought to promote Conservative politics in Northern Ireland it might have signalled
that the people of the province are after all equal and cherished citizens of the United
Kingdom. Unequivocal endorsement of Conservative candidates might even have lent
some credence to the famous Thatcherite maxim that the six counties are as British as
Finchley. In reality, of course, Conservative Central Office chose instead to behave as
though the Ulster Tories simply did not exist. This particular decision evidently derives
from the strategic interests of the British state. Over the last century, Westminster and
Whitehall have operated on the assumption that the north of Ireland is irretrievably
'different' from the rest of the United Kingdom (Bew and Patterson 1987b, 43; McGarry
and O'Leary 1995, 113-5). The construction of Northern Ireland as exceptional was
clearly inscribed in the conduct of the leadership of the Conservative Party after the
decision to accept members from the province. In allowing the Ulster Tories to 'wither
on the vine', Conservative Central Office offered one of the most explicit declarations
imaginable of the metropolitan conviction that the six counties are, and should remain,
'a place apart'.
The course that events took after the 1989 Conservative Party conference would
seem to underline that there are many among the political establishment in London
who simply do not regard the unionist community in Northern Ireland as genuinely
'British'. The sorry tale of the Ulster Tories would further appear to indicate that these
feelings of distance and aversion are mutual (O'Dowd 1998a, 115). The decision taken
at Blackpool offered Ulster unionists the opportunity - in principle at least - to adopt a
rather different approach towards the British state. The affiliation of the Ulster Tories
meant perhaps that the unionist community might be able to participate more fully in the
wider cultural and political life of the United Kingdom. In practice, of course, unionists
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declined to do so. While opinion polls consistently suggested that there were many
within the unionist fold interested in voting for the Conservative Party, most seemed
to lose their nerve upon entering the polling booth. The dismal failure of the Ulster
Tories reveals a great deal about the nature of modem unionism. Ulster unionists have
frequently decried that the machinations of London inter alia has forced them to the
very margins .of the United Kingdom. The resolute rejection of the Northern Ireland
Conservatives would suggest, however, that the edge of the Union might well be the
place where the unionist people feel most comfortable.
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